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Este trabajo examina la batalla de Haliarto (395 B.C.) analizando la estrategia de los contendientes, los con-
tingentes que concurrieron en ambos bandos y las rutas que siguieron los diferentes ejércitos hasta el campo de
batalla, especialmente Lisandro, que empleó una ruta por el interior de Beocia, la ruta de Koutoumoulia y Evan-
gelistria, y acampó en torno a la actual Mazi, aproximadamente a un kilómetro al sur de Haliarto, y presenta la
batalla en gran medida como una emboscada tebana.
This paper reviews the battle of Haliartos (395 B.C.) analyzing the strategy of the contendings, both sides
contingents and the routes followed by the armies in their way to the battlefield, especially Lysander, who used an
inland boiotian route, the route of Koutomoulia and Evangelistria, and camped in the surroundings of modern
Mazi about one kilometre to the south of Haliartos, and drew up in battle to a great extent as a Theban ambush.
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1. THE SPARTAN INVASION
In 395, less than a decade after the Peloponnesian War had ended, the (First) Boiotian
War1 broke out, prelude and part of another widespread conflict, which would last for nine
years before the King’s Peace was signed in the spring of 386, commonly called the
Korinthian War, in which Sparta and her allies fought against a coalition of states that
included, amongst others2, Athens, the Boiotian Confederacy, Argos and Korinth, supported
by Persia. To use the language of Thoukydides (1.23.6), the main cause, ¶lhqestßth
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* Departamento de Historia Antigua. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.
1 Diod.14.81.4; cf. Buck, 1994: 30-39. Diodoros (15.25.1, 28.5) also uses this term for the war from 378 to
375 (Theban War in Isaios.9.14). See on this latter conflict: Munn, 1993: 129-172.
2 In addition to those mentioned, the alliance included, from 394 onwards, Larissa, the whole of Euboia,
Leukas, Akarnania, Amprakia, the Chalkidians of Thrake, both Lokrians, Athamanians, Malians and Ainians
(Diod.14.82.1-10; X.HG.4.2.17; Tod GHI.2, nºs 101, 102 and 103).
pr’fasij, lay in the fear of Spartan imperialism, which the mainland Greek states perceived
to be such a serious threat that they were prepared to face a war if it would check Spartan
ambition (Hornblower, 1990: 123).
The Boiotian War is the name given specifically to the first year of the Korinthian War
and began with a confrontation between Phokians and Lokrians, probably the Eastern
Lokrians3, followed by an incursion by Lokrians and Boiotians into Phokis (Hell.Ox.21.5),
Sparta’s main ally in central Greece. After these initial skirmishes, which served as immediate
causes that ignited the conflagration, late in the summer of 3954, the Lakedaimonians planned
a two-pronged invasion of Boiotia by the northwest and the southwest5, which would
culminate in the battle of Haliartos. Apart from some criticism of the sources6, this battle has
in general, received little attention from scholars. 
The Spartan plan was that Lysander, with a small Peloponnesian contingent, would land
in Phokis and, after mustering Sparta’s allies in central Greece, would invade Boiotia from
the northwest. Meanwhile, King Pausanias, with the bulk of the Lakedaimonian and
Peloponnesian army, would attack it from the southwest through the Kithairon, the mountain
chain separating Attica and Megara from Boiotia. The two armies would converge in the
Boiotian city of Haliartos on a pre-arranged date and attack the Boiotians and the Athenians,
who would come to the aid of the Boiotians. Haliartos occupied a strategic position between
the east and west of Boiotia (Buck, 1994: 38) and Spartan control would practically deny the
Thebans access to the western half of Boiotia. Moreover Haliartos was less than a day’s
march from Thebes, the most populous and important city of Boiotia, and from there the
Spartans would be able to plunder Theban territory with relative ease. 
The Spartans probably hoped to win a swift (Buckler, 2003: 79) and decisive victory in a
pitched battle. The Spartans also set themselves other fundamental objectives: they would have
been aware of the resentment brewing in some Boiotian cities, particularly Orchomenos, at
Theban hegemony so the double Spartan invasion aspired to promote the defection of the
Boiotian cities, which would lead to the break up of the Confederacy.7 Lakedaimonian strategy
also recognised the need to reassert a Spartan presence amongst her allies in central Greece,
since, as we said, Phokis had just been invaded by the Lokrians and Boiotians, and Sparta
needed to prove she would not abandon her allies or allow them to be attacked with impunity.
In themselves, the proposed attack on Boiotia from the northwest and the idea of a two-
pronged invasion to provoke dissention within the Confederacy were nothing new and both
had been part of Athenian strategy during the Archidamian War. In 426, the Athenian
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3 Hell.Ox. 19.1, 21.1-5, 14; Paus.3.9.7-11 and X.HG.3.5.3-4, whose accounts differ considerably, particularly
concerning whether Opuntian or Eastern Lokris (Xenophon) or the Hesperian or Western Lokris (Hellenika
Oxyrhynchia and Pausanias) was involved. However, whichever Lokris was the combatant, it was a recognised
friend and ally of the Thebans (X HG.3.5.4: fàlhn te kaà s mmacon eênai) or had always been a friend
(Hell.Ox.13.3: ei p’te filàwj), which is truer of Eastern Lokris.
4 We have essentially followed the chronology of Beloch.GG.3.1.67-70. This dates the Boiotian and Lokrian
invasion of Phokis to the end of May 395 and the battle of Haliartos to August. On the chronology of the
Korinthian War in general, see: Funke, 1980: 76-101.
5 X.HG.3.5.17; Diod.14.84.1; Plut.Lys.28.2; Paus.3.5.3-4; Seager, 1994: 99.
6 Westlake, 1985: 119-133, which is still the fundamental work, especially with regard to the sources. He also
attempts to reconcile the sources in order to obtain a coherent account of the battle. See also Cook, 1981: 280-300
and Buckler, 2003: 79-82 (undoubtedly one of the best).
7 Nepos (Lis.3.4) claims that Lysander was sent to help the Orchomenians, suggesting that the city defected
before the Spartan invasion. This assertion lacks any basis since Orchomenos broke away from the Boiotian
Confederacy when Lysander reached the gates of the city and not before (X.HG.3.5.6; Plut.Lys.28.1-2; Cook 1981:
257, n. 41). Orchomenos, with an area (198 km2) rather less than average for a Boiotian federal district (225-250 km2)
had to bear the charges of a complete district and probably two thirds of another (cf. Hell.Ox.19.3; Pascual, 1996, 138-
140).
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strategos Demosthenes, who had invaded Leukas, allowed the Messenians of Naupaktos to
convince him to wage a campaign against the Aitolians (Th.3.95-98). However,
Demosthenes’ plan went much further than a simple incursion into Aitolia. Once he had
defeated the Aitolians, he planned to attack Boiotia with the forces available to him: a few
hundred epibatai that had come with the ships8, together with the Aitolians, Hesperian
Lokrians, Messenians, Zakynthians and Kephallenians, without the need for any additional
troops from Athens. In this way, starting from Aitolia, he planned to cross Western Lokrian
territory to Kytinion in Doris, and from there he would cross Phokis and invade Boiotia.9
In 429 an Athenian fleet of sixty ships, commanded by the strategos Nikias, had set sail
from Oropos with two thousand hoplites, and must have landed in Tanagraian territory. At the
same time an expeditionary force marching overland from Athens would join forces with
them to plunder Tanagraian lands. The rendezvous took place, the Tanagraians and other
Boiotians came out to do battle with them but they were defeated (Th.3.91). In 424, in the
campaign that ended in Athenian defeat at the battle of Delion, the Athenians also planned a
two-stage attack on Boiotia. In a first phase the Boiotian democrats would try to stir up a
revolt in Chaironeia, a polis situated in the west of Boiotia and subject at that time to
Orchomenos, and Siphai, a polis which was a port on the Gulf of Korinth also dominated by
Thespiai. The democratic revolts would be supported by the Athenians, who would have to
take Siphai by sea, and Delion, on the Euboian Channel, by land on the same day. Siphai
would be occupied by the forces stationed in Naupaktos, with an additional forty ships, plus
the Akarnanians and the other Athenian allies in the area, while Delion would be taken by an
army from Athens.10 The ultimate objective of Athenian strategy was to incite certain
Boiotian cities (Chaironeia, Thespiai and Tanagra) to defect, and this would lead to the break
up of the Boiotian Confederacy controlled by Thebes. 
In 395 Lakedaimonian strategy was very similar to the Athenian in terms of design and
objectives and there can be little doubt that the Spartan plan took these precedents into
account (Buck, 1993: 96). The main difference was that this time they would have the
advantage of previous experience and would use it in a single attack. Thus, as with
Demosthenes, the idea was to attack from the west with a small expeditionary force, mobilise
Spartan allies in central Greece and, without using any other Lakedaimonian troops, attack
Boiotia through Phokis. At the same time, as in the Athenian campaign of 424, King
Pausanias would advance by land from the Peloponnese and enter Boiotia from the
southwest. This coordinated attack was, like the Athenian offensive of 429, concentric in
character, since the two contingents would have to join forces in Haliartos. The main
objective of the double invasion was to break up the Boiotian Confederacy. Defections from
the Boiotian Confederacy would force the Thebans and Boiotians to sue for peace.
Moreover, Spartan strategy had the advantage of guaranteeing the successful invasion of
Boiotia: if the Boiotians tried to prevent Lysander invading by defending the Chaironeia pass,
in the west of Boiotia, they would have to leave the city of Thebes and the whole of southern
Boiotia exposed to King Pausanias’ army and he would be able to attack them from the rear.
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8 Th.3.95.2. The epibatai were hoplites on board ship, usually a group of ten on each ship (cf. Amit, 1962:
158; 1965: 29-30; Eddy, 1964: 142.)
9 Demosthenes tried to leave Hesperian Lokris by the so-called Isthmian Corridor through Amphissa, which
is today the route taken by the Galaxidi-Amphissa-Gravia-Bralos road (Hdt.8.31-2; Kase, Szmeler, 1982: 353-
366). From Kytinion in Doris (IG.VII.3055; Th.3.95.1; Aischin.2.116; Philokoros.FGrH.328 F56b), identifies as
the ancient site in Palaiochori, on the southern slopes of the Kallidromon, Demosthenes would have to entered
Phokis through the Kephisos valley.
10 Th.4.76-77, 90-101; Diod.12.69-70; Paus.9.6.3; Kromayer, Veith,  Kaupert, 1931: 177-98; Pritchett, 1969:
24-36.
If, on the contrary, they took up a position on the Kithairon, to prevent Pausanias’ attack11,
the whole of western Boiotia would be at Lysander’s mercy, and he would also be able to
advance on the Boiotian army stationed in the south from the rear. 
Finally, this plan would further Lysander’s personal ambitions. He was the main
instigator of the war, he convinced the ephors to decree mobilisation12 and was responsible
for devising Spartan strategy. Excluded from the Spartan campaigns in Asia and on bad terms
with King Agesilaos13, Lysander wanted to shift the centre of gravity of Spartan politics
towards Europe so he could play a leading role. The best way of reinforcing his political
position was to obtain a military command, but if Sparta sent a single army, that of the
Peloponnesian League, the ephors would, in all probability, have given the command to his
rival, King Pausanias.14 Thus, a double invasion guaranteed Lysander a command and gave
him the opportunity to revive his fame and influence in Sparta. We do not know his specific
title, but Lysander was very possibly sent as harmost with authority in the whole of central
Greece. Plutarch (Lys.28.1) states that he was sent with command (hegemonia) of the army
to garrison, i.e., occupy, Boiotia (frour™n ùp a to j), duties usually carried out by a
Spartan harmost, whether over a wide area or in a single place. 
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11 On the importance of the Kithairon pass for preventing an invasion of Boiotia from the south see
X.HG.5.4.36: Agesilaos, in 378, recognised that, unless Kithairon was taken first, it would not be easy to attack
Thebes; X.HG.5.4.47: In 377, Agesilaos ordered the Spartan polemarch at Thespiai to take control of the Kithairon
so they could invade Boiotia, and X.HG.5.4.59: in the spring of 376, Kleombrotos could not reach Boiotia because
the Thebans had previously occupied the Kithairon.
12 Plut.Lys.27-28; Bommelaer, 1981: 192.
13 X.HG.3.4.10; Plut.Lys.23-24, Ages.7-8. Cf. Hamilton 1991: 32-39.
14 They led opposing factions: Hamilton 1970: 294-295 and 1979: 82-85.
Fig. 1. The Boiotian Confederacy in 395 B.C. (Oropos probably not included)
However, the Spartan invasion plan had at least two serious drawbacks. At the
operational level, Lysander and Pausanias shared command and control, and they were
virtually unable to communicate with each other, so the first problem was the extraordinary
difficulty of joining forces in Haliartos on the day fixed. In view of the distance that both
armies had to cover, the troops that had to rendezvous and the lack of communication
between the two, it was much easier for one of the two expeditionary forces to go on ahead.
On the other hand, in terms of strategy, the Boiotians, who would be joined by the Athenians,
might defeat one of the two armies before the rendezvous took place, and this would leave
the other in a difficult situation and at a disadvantage in terms of numbers. 
Once both Lakedaimonian armies began to advance, the Boiotians realised what the
Spartans were planning (X.HG.3.5.7).15 At about the same time the Boiotians sent an
embassy to Athens (X.HG.3.5.7-16), probably around the beginning of August.16 The
diplomatic mission arrived at a singularly opportune moment. In Asia, a Spartan army under
King Agesilaos had won a resounding victory in Sardis over Pharnabazos17, which increased
Athenian fears of the creation of a Spartan empire in Asia and the Aegean. There had probably
already been a democratic revolt in Rhodes, and the Persian fleet, commanded by the
Athenian Konon, had occupied the island, and this also encouraged Athens to oppose
Sparta.18 Moreover, if Athens allowed the Lakedaimonians to subjugate Boiotia, the Spartan
threat would be even more serious, on land and sea, and the Lakedaimonians would easily be
able to reach Athenian territory from Boiotia. However, an alliance with Boiotia could dispel
the spectre of an invasion of Attica and would also further the personal ambitions of
Thrasyboulos, at that time the most influential Athenian statesman, to the detriment of his
rival, now Persian admiral Konon19, since Thrasyboulos would lead the Athenian
expeditionary force in Boiotia. As an incentive, the Boiotian emissaries offered the Athenians
the possibility of recovering their old empire (X.HG.3.5.10) and leading of the alliance
(X.HG.3.5.14). This mixture of threats, promises and factional infighting explains how the
Boiotians succeeded in obtaining Athenian support in the form of a defensive alliance, or
epimachia, which, although it obliged the Athenians to come to the aid of the Boiotians if the
Spartans invaded Boiotia, did not mean declaring war on Sparta.20 Thus the Athenians
avoided directly challenging the Spartans and being accused of breaking their undertaking to
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15 Preparations must have been made with considerably secrecy (Westlake, 1985: 125) but the Boiotians
knew there would be some kind of attack (Buck, 1993: 96) and must have understood the Spartan strategy when
Lysander and Pausanias started moving, if not before. 
16 Diodoros (14.81.1-4) dates the battle of Haliartos when Phormion was archon at Athens (396/5) and the
alliance between Boiotians and Athenians when Diophantos was archon (395/4); he therefore thinks the Athenians
did not take part because they were not yet allies. However, we can be certain that the Athenians did send an
expeditionary force to Boiotia and the alliance must therefore have existed before the battle. Diodoros, who was
better acquainted with the Athenian sources, probably dated the battle wrongly, but not the treaty of alliance, which
must have been signed at the beginning of the year in which Diophantos became archon, which began on 25 July
395.
17 Hell.Ox.15.1-6; X.HG.3.4.20-24; Plut.Ages.10.1-4; Polyenos.2.1.9; Nep.Ages.3.3-6; Frontin.1.8.12;
Isoc.4.144; Diod.14.80.1-4; Paus.3.9.5-6; Dugas, 1910: 58-95; Kromayer, Veith, Kaupert, 1931: 274-89;
Cornelius, 1932: 29-31; Bruce 1967, Appendix 1 “The Battle of Sardis,” 150-156; Anderson,  1975: 27-53; Gray,
1979: 183-200 and De Voto, 1988: 41-53.
18 Hell.Ox.18.1-3; Diod.14.79.6; Paus.6.7.6; Bruce, 1961: 166 and ff.
19 Strauss, 1984: 37-48.
20 The ambassadors also claimed they were fighting in self defence, since the Spartans were planning to
attack Boiotia (And.3.20 and ff.). They were supported by Thrasyboulos and the vote in favour of the alliance was
unanimous (X.HG.3.5.16, Ar.Eccl.195 and ff.; Seager, 1967: 96; 1994: 100; Hamilton, 1979: 206; Cartledge 1987:
292); however, the alliance was defensive (Tod GHI, 2 nº 101; Lys.16.13; Alonso Troncoso, 1997: 30-35). Contra
Accame (1951, 51), for whom the alliance was a deliberate and definitive act, declaring war on Sparta.
Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War (X.HG.2.2.20), while at the same time laying the
groundwork for armed opposition to the Lakedaimonians. 
Turning to Boiotian strategy, as we have said, the Spartan double invasion plan meant
that the Boiotians could not station troops on the borders of Boiotia, or in Chaironeia, to the
west, or on the Kithairon, in the south. At the same time, since they did not know the route
the two armies would take or the place and date of their planned rendezvous, they could not
anticipate it and challenge either army separately. Neither could they muster the Boiotian
army, which would have meant withdrawing troops that were protecting the cities; in fact, the
Haliartians appear to have remained inside their city throughout the campaign. Lysander
could not take Chaironeia, Lebadeia or Koroneia because these cities would have been
garrisoned by their respective citizens and, above all, if some thousand Orchomenians had
concentrated with the Boiotian army in Thebes, it would have been difficult for the city to
defect. The decision must have been that all or some of each city’s troops should defend its
own walls (Buck, 1994: 38) and only the Theban army would remain in Thebes where it
would await the Athenian expeditionary force. They obviously had to prevent the
Lakedaimonians laying siege to or occupying the most important city in Boiotia and the
capital of the Boiotian Confederacy. Boiotia could hold out if any other city fell, but the
conquest of Thebes would lead directly to defeat. The city must also have been the ultimate
goal of the Lakedaimonian expedition. At the same time Thebes was the hub of Boiotian
communications and the army could move swiftly in any direction from Thebes and reach the
place under threat. If the Boiotians succeeded in discovering where their enemies planned to
rendezvous before they joined forces, they could march rapidly and attack the enemy,
especially the weaker army, the one led by Lysander. If they defeated Lysander, the Boiotians
and the Athenians could join forces again and destroy Pausanias. If, on the contrary, they did
not succeed in finding out where their enemies would meet, Boiotians and Athenians would
wait in Thebes for Lysander and Pausanias and would probably fight them in Theban territory
without confining themselves behind the city walls.21 It is also possible that the Boiotians
were taken by surprise by the speed of Spartan preparations, perhaps undertaken in great
secrecy, and by the strategy of a double invasion itself. 
2. ACCOUNTS OF THE BATTLE OF HALIARTOS
The sources for the battle of Haliartos are Xenophon (HG. 3.5.6-7, 9, 17-24) and Plutarch
(Lys.27-9, cf. Mor.408 A-B, 578 A-B) and, to a lesser extent, Diodoros (14.81.1-3) and
Pausanias (3.5.3-6). Additional information can be found in Nepos (Lis.3.4), Lysias (16.13-
14) and Demosthenes (4.17 18.96).
According to Xenophon, Lysander, with an army that included Phokians, Orchomenians
and the peoples of central Greece, reached Haliartos before Pausanias. Once in Haliartos, 
as the day went on and Pausanias failed to arrive, he did not wait for him, and 
rather than holding back, he marched towards the city walls, calling on the Haliartians 
to defect from the Confederacy and become independent (X.HG.3.5.18: ôpeiqen 
a to j ¶fàstasqai ka a ton’mouj gàgnesqai). However, there were also some
Thebans within the city, and they opposed this, so Lysander assaulted the walls (ùpei d° t¸n
Qhbaàwn tin°j  ntej ùn t¸ teàcei diekˆluon, prosûbale pr‘j t‘ te^icoj -
X.HG.3.5.18). He goes on to say (HG.3.5.19) that, when the Thebans realised what was
i\ u`u\u`
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21 As they did in 378 and 377, see Munn, 1987: 106-138.
happening, they hastened to defend the city with hoplites and cavalry (¶ko santej d°
ta^uta o Qhba^ioi, dr’mˆ ùbohqoun oâ te ”pl^itai ka o `ippe^ij).
From then on Xenophon (HG.3.5.19) is unsure about exactly what happened, whether the
Thebans took Lysander by surprise before he realised what was happening or whether
Lysander saw them coming, but thought he could withstand the attack and defeat them
(”p’tera m°n ou^n, eåte laq’ntej t n L sandron ùpûpeson a t¸ eâte ka
aásq’menoj prosi’ntaj j krat¡swn pômenen). In either case, the author says, the
battle was fought beside the walls and Lysander and many others died. After Lysander’s
death, the others fled into the mountains (pr j t ÷roj) and the Thebans pursued them
but were slowed down by steep and rugged terrain (dusxwràa te ka stenoporàa), at
which point Lysander’s hoplites turned and hurled javelins and stones at them. The Thebans
turned back halfway up the hill, but more than two hundred of them were killed
(X.HG.3.5.20).
During the night, the Phokians and the others, i.e., the Orchomenians and the levies from
central Greece, withdrew and the next day Pausanias arrived with his army from the
Peloponnese (X.HG.3.5.21). The following day, the second after the battle, the Athenians
arrived and adopted battle formation with the Thebans. Pausanias assessed the situation and,
seeing that the Korinthians had refused to take part in the expedition, the Phokians had gone
home, the other allies were serving reluctantly, the enemy’s cavalry outnumbered his own,
and the bodies of the dead lay close to the wall, decided to negotiate a truce and withdraw
without fighting, against the advice of some Spartan commanders (X.HG.3.5.22-25).
According to Plutarch (Lys.28.1-2), Lysander mustered the army in Phokis, invaded
Boiotia and advanced against Orchomenos. When they saw him approach, the Orchomenians
opened the gates and their army joined forces with Lysander’s troops and together they
invaded and plundered Lebadeian territory. While in Lebadeia, he sent Pausanias a message,
urging him to meet him the following day in Haliartos, which he said he would reach by
dawn. However, the letter was intercepted by the Boiotians, so they now knew where and
when the enemy armies would rendezvous. The Thebans left the Athenians protecting Thebes
and when night fell they set off at a forced march, reaching Haliartos before Lysander, and
sent part of the army into the city (Plut.Lys.28.3: ôfqasan ‘làgJ t n L sandron ùn`
AlißrtJ gen’menoi ka mûrei tin par^hlqon eáj t¬n p’lin). Meanwhile Lysander
advanced until he was within sight of the walls of Haliartos and posted his army on a hill
close to the city, called Orchalides or Alopeke (the Fox-hill), a part of the Helikon
(Plut.Lys.29.7), intending to wait for Pausanias. But, as the day wore on and as he began to
get restless, he marched his army along the road that led directly to the walls of Haliartos. Just
as they reached the river Hoplites they were attacked from the rear, beside the Kissousa spring
at the tomb of Alea-Rhadamanthos22 by the Thebans who had remained outside the city and
had its walls on their left (Plut.Lys.28.4: t^wn d° Qhbaàwn oi m°n ôxw memenhk’tej ôn
¶rister^a t¬n p’lin lab’ntej). At the same time, the Haliartians and Thebans within the
city suddenly opened the city gates and attacked the enemy forces from the front, killing
Lysander and some of the others. The Spartan army broke ranks and the Thebans pursued
them, killing several thousand in all, but some three hundred Thebans were caught in rugged
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22 Cf. also Plut.Mor.408 A-B: The Orchalides hill, also called the Alopeke (Fox-hill), and the river Hoplites,
next to which Lysander was killed by Neokoros of Haliartos and Mor.578 A-B: the tomb of Alea. On the location
of the Kissousa spring, Frazer (5.165) considers it to be at the northern foot of Haliartos and Buckler (2003: 80
n.7) to be a spring, today channelled, which flows at the foot of the Helikon, just opposite Haliartos.
King Pausanias received the news of Lysander’s defeat on the road between Plataiai and
Thespiai before reaching Haliartos. Against the advice of the Spartiates who were with him,
he negotiated to retrieve the bodies. In the course of the retreat, Pausanias buried Lysander’s
body in the Panopeans’ territory, beside the Sacred Way from Chaironeia to Delphi
(Plut.Lys.29.1-3). 
In Pausanias’ account (3.5.3-6), Lysander reached Phokis and, after mustering the
Phokian army, invaded Boiotia and launched an assault on the walls of Haliartos because the
city refused to desert Thebes. Some Thebans and Athenians entered the city unseen (kru/fa),
took up a position before the walls and slayed Lysander. King Pausanias arrived too late for
the battle and, when he heard of Lysander’s defeat, led his army against Thebes with the
intention of attacking it, but when he learnt that Thrasyboulos was approaching with the
Athenians and planned to attack them from the rear when they were in the midst of fighting
the Thebans, he negotiated a truce with the Thebans, which is praised by this author. 
Diodoros (14.81.1-3) adds that Lysander reached Phokis with a few soldiers and that
Pausanias was sent with six thousand men. The Boiotians entered battle alone, without the
Athenians, when they found Haliartos besieged by Lysander and the Phokians.23
Xenophon used also and Athenian sources (Buck, 1993: 97), which can be clearly seen
in his account of the Boiotian embassy to Athens and the Thebans’ discourse to the Athenian
assembly, and his account is remarkable for its blatant antipathy to Thebes (Westlake 1985:
123) and pro-Spartan bias, also evident in the rest of his works. According to him, the
Lakedaimonians were going to invade the Theban chora (HG.3.5.7) and not Boiotia, it was
the Thebans and not the Boiotians who were preparing to defend themselves (HG.3.5.17), and
the Thebans and not the Boiotian Confederacy that sent an embassy to Athens (HG.3.5.7). In
short, far from accepting the existence of the Boiotian Confederacy, Xenophon always refers
to the Thebans and asserts that all Boiotia was subject to Thebes. In fact, he says, the
Haliartians wanted to break away and were only prevented from doing so by the Thebans
within the city, who had entered it with the specific intention of preventing them
(X.HG.3.5.18). In this last respect Xenophon’s account is not only tendentious but obviously
inaccurate. Lebadeia had refused to leave the Confederacy without any Theban garrison
within its walls, and as a result Lysander had plundered its territory. We can assume the same
to be true of Chaironeia and Koroneia, whose territories Lysander crossed, at least the
Koroneian. They too remained in the Confederacy, without Thebes having to station soldiers
in either of these two cities. Just as Xenophon knew that Orchomenos had defected, he also
knew that the other cities resisted, but did not say so to avoid giving the impression that some
cities wanted to remain under what this author considered to be the tyrannical rule of Thebes. 
Xenophon describes what happened in Haliartos from the Lakedaimonian point of view.
Since he was in Asia at the time with the army of the Spartan king Agesilaos and did not
witness the events24, his informant must have been a Lakedaimonian. Within this pro-Spartan
version of what happened, one aspect of his account is particularly striking, in our opinion,
and this is the differences we can see between various parts of his narrative. Thus he describes
Lysander’s march towards Haliartos very briefly, and gives a confused account of the battle
itself (HG.3.5.17-19). This contrasts with his detailed description of how Lysander’s army
was pursued over rough terrain and the vivid account of Pausanias’ arrival, the disagreement
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23 Seager (1994: 100) thinks that the city was effectively under siege and Larsen (1968: 159) seems to think
it had been taken.
24 Xenophon had joined Cyros’ expedition in 402 (X.Anab.3.1.4) and then the Spartan Thibron’s army in
Asia in 400/399 (X.Anab.7.8.22). He returned to Asia with Agesilaos’ army in 394, a year after the battle
(X.Anab.4.2.18). Cf. Delebecque, 1957: 130-165.
between the Spartan commanders and the Lakedaimonians’ retreat, harried by the Boiotians
who attacked anyone who left the path and set foot in the fields (HG.3.5.20-24). This
contradiction would be explained by assuming that Xenophon’s Lakedaimonian informant
had served in Pausanias’ army so had not witnessed the battle, and was perhaps even one of
the Spartan leaders opposed to signing the truce.25 If this were so, Xenophon would only have
had a vague idea of Lysander’s action, apart from the pursuit over rugged ground, which was
where Pausanias’ army took up a position the following day. With no Theban sources on the
crucial matter of the battle, the sudden appearance of the Theban army, Xenophon was unable
to obtain reliable information about what happened, and was thus uncertain about the details
(HG.3.5.19). 
Compared with Xenophon’s account, Plutarch’s narrative is much fuller, more precise,
richer in details, particularly topographic, and contains virtually no inconsistencies.26
Although Plutarch used Xenophon’s text, it seems clear that it was not his main source.
Firstly, he was acquainted with local legends (Lys.29.5-12; Mor.408 A-B), at least some of
which he was probably told orally by natives of Haliartos; we can also assume that he visited
the battlefield, which could be reached in a day from where he lived in Chaironeia, and that
he consulted Boiotian or pro-Boiotian sources27. In contrast to Xenophon, Plutarch gives the
Theban view of the events at Haliartos. In fact, his description provides the basis for
explaining the battle and its main contributions, in addition to the various topographical
details, are the episode of the letter, the arrival of the Theban contingent before Lysander and
the positions of the two armies before and during the battle. 
The most striking feature of Pausanias’ account is the emphasis it puts on Athenian
intervention, which is probably because he used an Athenian source, perhaps Androtion28
who must also have used Lakedaimonian or other pro-Spartan sources. His narrative also
relieves King Pausanias of any blame: he arrived too late for the battle because he was
assembling his army, even so he advanced towards Thebes and the truce he negotiated and
subsequent withdrawal saved the army. He mistakenly says there were Athenians in Haliartos
and that Pausanias marched against the city of Thebes, confusing the Pausanias’ routes of
approach and retreat, and thinks that the Boiotian and Athenian armies did not join forces
before the truce. His best contributions concern the Thebans’ secrecy in getting a contingent
into Haliartos, the movements of Thrasyboulos and Pausanias’ decision to negotiate a truce. 
Diodoros’ account is brief and not very enlightening and probably derives, via Ephoros,
from the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia which would have given a detailed account of the battle.
Diodoros correctly gives the number of Boiotian casualties suffered while pursuing
Lysander’s army and the number of soldiers in Pausanias’ army, some six thousand. He also
says that the Boiotians fought alone without Athenian help, which is only partly true, since it
seems to suggest that the Athenians were not in Boiotia; however, they had come to their
defence and were protecting Thebes. 
Thus there remain a number of doubtful or contradictory points that need to be resolved
in order to reconstruct the battle successfully. These discrepancies and uncertainties relate
mainly to the number of troops present, the battle itself and, in particular, the routes taken by
the two sides to reach Haliartos. It is precisely a knowledge of the routes taken by the two
armies to reach Haliartos that will help us, in my opinion decisively, to explain this battle. 
25 For a similar situation during the Battle of Leuktra, cf. X.HG.6.4.3-5, 8, 12; Buckler, 1996: 128.
26 The only uncertainty that arises in Plutarch’s account is that he does not explain why Lysander decided
not to wait any longer encamped outside Haliartos. 
27 Cook, 1981: 292; idem in the Battle of Koroneia in 394: cf. Fornis, 2003: 156.
28 Westlake 1985: 121; Buck, 1994: 140 n. 67.
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3. THE TWO ARMIES’ TROOPS.
We only know the number of soldiers – six thousand – in Pausanias’ army, and have no
other details. In the case of Lysander’s army, Diodoros (14.84.1) says that he reached Phokis
with a few soldiers (met™ stratiwtw^n ‘làgwn). The following year, in the summer of
394, at the Battle of Koroneia, Agesilaos had half a Spartan mora from the Orchomenos
garrison in his army (X.HG.4.3.15).29 The other half may have remained in the city to
protect it. Although the mora could have been left in Orchomenos by Pausanias as he
retreated after the Battle of Haliartos, it seems more likely that it had been stationed there
by Lysander. It was Lysander that had entered Orchomenos whereas Pausanias had to retreat
along a predetermined route from which he was not allowed to depart in any way. This was
the Sacred Way, which started in Chaironeia and went to Panopeos, Daulis and Delphi, and
it was some way from Orchomenos. This Spartan garrison must already have been in
Orchomenos in the summer of 395, before Agesilaos arrived, and this would explain,
together with Spartan control of Phokis, why the Boiotians did not attack it immediately
after Haliartos30 or in the course of the expedition the following spring that took the
Boiotians to Pharsalos.31 We can thus assume that the army Lysander brought from the
Peloponnese would have included, at least, one Lakedaimonian mora, some six hundred
hoplites32, and perhaps a small levy of allied troops. This contingent could have amounted
to a thousand soldiers.
Xenophon (HG.3.5.6) explicitly says that Lysander’s army included Phokians, Oitaians,
Herakleots, Malians and Ainians and later (X.HG.3.5.17) that Lysander appeared in
Haliartos with an army from Phokis, Orchomenos and the surrounding area. Pausanias
(3.5.3) states that the Phokians came in large numbers and Diodoros (14.84.1) and Plutarch
(Lys.28) say that all the Phokians took part. It seems clear that the Phokians were the main
contingent of the army. However, the various figures we have for Phokian contingents that
might help us determine their number in Lysander’s army are very small. A thousand
Phokians guarded the Anopaia Path at the Battle of Thermopylai (Hdt.9.17.2). This
contingent of a thousand hoplites was just part of the Phokians’ army. In fact, Herodotos says
the thousand hoplites in Plataiai did not account for all the Phokians (Hdt.9.31.5) and in the
first year of the Sacred War (356/5) Philomelos, the federal strategos, mustered a force of a
thousand chosen Phokians (Diod.16.24.2). In the expedition of 394 undertaken by the
Argives and Boiotians in central Greece the Phokians, under the command of the Spartan
Alkisthenes, fought an army of six thousand men in Naryka, in Epiknemidian Lokris. The
Phokians were defeated and lost a thousand men (Diod.14.82.7-9). According to Pausanias
(10.20.3), in the Galatian invasion of 279, the Phokians sent three thousand hoplites and five
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29 Agesilaos’ troops were not actually Lakedaimonians; he had gone to Asia with two thousand emancipated
helots and six thousand allies (X.HG.3.4.2) and Thibron had previously taken a thousand emancipated helots and
four thousand Peloponnesians (X.HG.3.1.3). As well as the half mora from the Orchomenos garrison, Agesilaos
had another complete mora that had come by sea from Korinth (X.HG.4.3.15).
30 See a similar situation in Plut.Pel.16-17: in the spring of 375 the Thebans tried to take Orchomenos by
surprise, taking advantage of the fact that the Lakedaimonian mora garrisoning the city had embarked on an
expedition against Eastern Lokris.
31 The Lakedaimonian garrison was maintained throughout the whole of the war (cf. X.HG.5.1.29) and we
have no evidence of Orchomenos being attacked at any time during the conflict. 
32 In 395 a Spartan mora consisted of five hundred and seventy-six hoplites under the command of a
polemarch. It was divided into four lochoi, eight pentekostyes and sixteen enomitiai, each of which had thirty-six
men. In addition to these there were a hundred horsemen (cf. X.Lak.Pol.11.4; HG.6.4.12; Sekunda, 1998: 15).
According to Plutarch (Pel.17.2), Ephoros stated that a mora consisted of five hundred men, Kallisthenes six
hundred and Polybios nine hundred (the latter author was referring to the Hellenistic mora).
hundred horsemen to defend Thermopylai, a figure that must be closer to Phokis’
possibilities. Moreover, in 395 the Phokians had been invaded by the Lokrians and the
Boiotians not long before, so it would be logical for them to turn out in force. A figure of at
least three thousand hoplites, close to the maximum we know the Phokians could have
supplied, does not seem excessive. 
Later, after Lysander had invaded Boiotia and Orchomenos had left the Confederacy (cf.:
Plut.Lys.28.2), the Orchomenians joined him. In the Boiotian Confederacy of 395
Orchomenos was, together with Hysiai, on of the two combined districts that had to
contribute two thousand hoplites and two hundred horsemen to the Boiotian federal army
(each district had to provide a thousand hoplites and a hundred horsemen cf. Hell.Ox.19.3).
Since the territory of Hysiai was a quarter of the size of Orchomenos, we can assume that the
Orchomenians had to supply the number required for one district and part of another, perhaps
two thirds, and that they were able to muster between a thousand and one thousand five
hundred hoplites and more than a hundred horsemen (Pascual, 1995: 169-176). A figure of a
thousand Orchomenian hoplites and a hundred horsemen would probably be the minimum
Orchomenian contingent, particularly since a Lakedaimonian mora was garrisoning
Orchomenos and the city was not left undefended. 
In addition to the Phokians and the Orchomenians, the army that Lysander led to
Haliartos certainly included Oitaians, Herakleots, Ainians and Malians, and very probably
Dorians and Athamanians too.33 In the spring of 394, in the course of the expedition into
central Greece, two thousand Boiotians and Argives, under the command of the boiotarch
Hismenias, took Herakleia Trachinia, forced the Oitaians that had previously been expelled
by the Spartans to return, and persuaded the Ainians and  Athamanians to rebel against the
Lakedaimonians (Diod.14.82.7). Hismenias left the Argives garrisoning Herakleia and
mustered six thousand men for an attack against Phokis. These included the thousand
Boiotians that Hismenias had taken with him and also, according to Diodoros, the Ainians,
Athamanians and other allies (Diod.14.82.7), possibly Herakleots, Malians and troops from
both parts of Lokris, bringing their number to some five thousand all together. Apart for the
Hesperian Lokrians, who were too far away, and the Eastern Lokrians, at that time allies of
the Boiotians, a figure of some two thousand hoplites for the regions of Central Greece in
Lysander’s army is possible, so it would have had some five or six thousand hoplites. In any
case, this expeditionary force must have been similar in size to that of the Thebans and
Haliartians that fought the battle, since, according to Xenophon (HG.3.5.19), Lysander
thought he could resist the hoplites and Theban horsemen that attacked him. To this
contingent of hoplites would have to be added an unknown number of light infantry and
cavalry. 
We know that Pausanias set out overland in the direction of Kithairon, Plataiai and
Thespiai with a Peloponnese army consisting of six thousand men, with the intention of
invading Boiotia from the south, directly threatening Thebes. Possibly Diodoros only
includes hoplites and horsemen in this figure, so light infantry would also have to be
added.
33 Spartan hegemony in the region was the outcome of the intervention of the Lakedaimonian Herippidas in
399 (Diod.14.38.4-5; Bequignon, 1937: 354). We have no knowledge of any other Spartan allies from central
Greece taking part, such as the Achaians of Phtiotis, Lycophron of Pherai, Pharsalos, the Hesperian Lokrians,
Aitolians, Athamanians and Dorians. The Achaians, Aitolians, Western Lokrians and Thessalians were possibly
too far away to join Lysander’s army quickly, but the Athamanians and Metropolitan Dorians may have been
involved.
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The number of soldiers in the Theban army is rather easier to establish. According to the
Hellenika Oxyrhynchia (19.3), in 395, the Thebans had four federal districts, so they would
have been able to muster some four thousand hoplites and four hundred horsemen. Obviously
this was not the entire force that Thebes succeeded in recruiting, but it may well have been
close to the maximum number of men between the ages of 20 and 49.34 If the Thebans left
the Athenians protecting their city, it can be assumed that they sent the whole of their federal
contingent plus a similar number of light infantry (psiloi and hamippoi pezoi).35 Haliartos had
a third of a federal district so it must have provided three hundred hoplites and about thirty
horsemen, that is, a company or lochos of heavy infantry and a squadron (hila) of cavalry, as
well as the corresponding light infantry. This was the minimum contingent that the
Haliartians could muster, but as the battle took place below its walls, the Haliartians fought
in large numbers, perhaps no less than five hundred counting both hoplites and horsemen. In
short, the Thebans and Haliartians would have had some five thousand hoplites and
horsemen, in addition to their light infantry.
We know the Athenians sent hoplites and horsemen (Lys.16.13) and perhaps also light
troops. In 378 the Athenians first sent five thousand hoplites and five hundred horsemen to
the aid of Thebes (Diod.15.25.1) and later, in the same year, another five thousand hoplites
and two hundred horsemen (Diod.15.32.2) to fight various Lakedaimonian expeditions. There
were six thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred horsemen at Nemea in 394
(X.HG.4.2.17) and some four hundred horsemen were sent to the aid of  Arcadia in 364
(X.HG.7.4.29). What is more, in 395 the Athenian expeditionary force was large enough for
the Thebans to entrust their city to it and resist a possible attack by Pausanias’ six thousand
men, and their cavalry, together with that of the Thebans and Haliartians, amply exceeded that
of Pausanias (X.HG.3.5.23). Thus we can assume that some five or six thousand Athenians,
counting solely hoplites and horsemen, were dispatched. 
To sum up, both armies would have had some eleven or twelve thousand soldiers,
counting hoplites and horsemen, to which would have to be added the respective contingents
of light infantry, which may have almost doubled their number. Approximately half of the two
armies’ forces would have fought in the battle. 
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34 The Thebans alone could have mustered a maximum of five or six thousand hoplites and horsemen: seven
thousand hoplites and two thousand horseman from Thebes and many other Boiotian cities defended Theban
territory in 378 (Diod.15.26.2); the Thebans accounted for less than a twelfth of an allied army of seventy thousand
(less than six thousand, cf. Plut.Pel.24) which invaded Lakonia in 370/69, and six thousand Thebans died in the
destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335, the immense majority probably between the ages of 18 and 59, and
more than thirty thousand women, children and old people were captured (Diod.17.14.1.)
35 In addition to the hoplites and horsemen, the Boiotians had their own non-mercenary light infantry corps
known as psiloi, of which there were seven thousand at Delion (Th.4.93.3). In the Spartan expedition against
Argos, in the summer of 418, the Boiotians sent five thousand hoplites and five thousand  psiloi (Th.5.57.52). We
can assume that this number was similar to the number of hoplites the federal army could muster, that is, about
eleven thousand. In the same expedition there were also five hundred horsemen and five hundred hamippoi pezoi.
As we can see, the latter forces are equal in number to the cavalry. The hamippoi appear again in Xenophon
(HG.7.5.24) at the Battle of Mantinea in the summer of 362, so this corps certainly existed between the two dates
(418 to 362). The hamippoi were a kind of light infantry that fought on the flank of the horseman and their
numbers must have equalled those of the federal cavalry, about a thousand one hundred. Thus the total Boiotian
federal army would have consisted of 24,200 men: eleven thousand hoplites, eleven thousand psiloi, one thousand
one hundred horsemen and one thousand one hundred hamippoi pezoi. On the psiloi and hamippoi in general, cf.
Sekunda, 2002: 21, 53-54, plates E1, E2, K1; Pascual, 1995: 411-425.
4. THE ROAD TO HALIARTOS 
We do not know which port in the Peloponnese Lysander sailed from. Korinth refused to
take part in the expedition, had shown signs of hostility towards the Lakedaimonians, and the
anti-Spartan faction was in power.36 It is true the Korinthians allowed Pausanias to pass, but
they must have been forced to do so by circumstances in view of the impossibility of
confronting the Spartans alone or obtaining outside help. In fact, immediately after Haliartos,
they joined the anti-Spartan coalition. In view of this hostility, it is difficult to imagine that
the Korinthians would have provided port facilities and allowed their ships to be used.
Although the Spartans could have used an Achaian port, in view of Korinth’s attitude and the
fact that in 395 Sikyon was a faithful ally of Sparta, had a good port and from 394 onwards
became the main base of Lakedaimonian land and sea operations in the Gulf against Korinth
(Pascual, 1995: 699-700), it seems more plausible that Lysander would sail from Sikyon. His
destination could have been the Gulf of Kirrha or Antikyra. The latter is the better choice,
since it is the starting point for the fastest route into the centre of Phokis, via Ambryssos.37
According to Xenophon (HG.3.5.6) the ephors ordered Lysander to go to Haliartos with
the Phokians, Oitaians, Herakleots, Malians and Ainians. Plutarch (Lys.28) says that he
marched through Phokis with a large force under his command and Diodoros (14.81.1) that
he entered Phokis and recruited the army (ùiselq n ùij t¬n Fwkàda sun¡gage d
namin). Pausanias (3.5.3) also says Lysander took large numbers of Phokians with him and
invaded Boiotia without delay (ôti ùpisx n xr’non ôj te Boiwtàan ùlhl qei). All
this evidence would suggest that Lysander remained in Phokis and the whole army, not just
the Phokians, massed in Phokis. In fact, if Lysander had been obliged to go to Herakleia, for
example, to recruit contingents from the towns of the Spercheios, his march would have been
considerably delayed and he would have had to have come back along the same route through
the Gravia Pass or through Eastern Lokris along the Boagrios Valley, which was hostile to the
Lakedaimonians. The best place to assemble the army would have been Elateia, the chief city
of Phokis and the federal capital, which was situated at a major crossroads within easy reach
of the troops from the Spercheios, although Lysander could also have congregated the army
in Daulis or Panopeos, at the start of the Sacred Way to Delphi, the route Pausanias used for
his retreat. 
To invade Boiotia from Phokis from the northwest, Lysander could have taken two
possible routes. The first goes through Elateia to Hyampolis and Abai. In Abai this road joins
the southbound route from Opous, crosses into Boiotia and goes on to Orchomenos. From
Orchomenos, it follows the shore of Lake Kopais to Lebadeia (Paus.9.28.7-9, 10.35.1). The
second route starts from Daulis, goes through Panopeos and Parapotamoi, enters Boiotia




36 Immediately after the Peloponnesian War, the Korinthians challenged the way Sparta divided the spoils
(X.HG.3.5.12) and sheltered the Athenian democrats that were fleeing from the rule of the Thirty (Aisch.2.147).
They must have felt threatened by Spartan intervention in the Gulf (Diod.14.34.2-3; Paus.4.26.3, 10.38.3) and
refused to send contingents to the Spartan expeditions against the democrats of the Piraios in 403 (X.HG.3.5.5)
against Elis in 401 (X.HG.3.2.25) and with Agesilaos to Asia in 396. On the anti-Lakedaimonian faction led by
Timolaos and Polyantes, cf. Hell.Ox.10.3; X.HG.3.5.1.
37 The city of Antikyra had a good port. In 196 the consul Flamininius led auxiliary troops from Antikyra by
this route to their winter camp in Elateia (Livy 32.18) and, conversely, Antonius concentrated provisions from all
over central Greece in Antikyra shortly before the battle of Aktio (Plut.Antonio.28); cf. also Paus.10.35.4 and
McInerney, 1999: 62.
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There is no clear-cut way of deciding between these two possibilities, but perhaps the
first route, through Abai to Orchomenos, is the most probable. The sources do not say that
Lysander passed through Chaironeia, and Plutarch, our main source, was a native of that
city. If Lysander had entered through Chaironeia, by marching first to Orchomenos and
then Lebadeia, he would have had to make a detour and then retrace his own steps.
Possible, but improbable, and hard to understand since Lysander could not risk losing time
or he might arrive late at Haliartos, where he was to rendezvous with Pausanias’ army.
Moreover, by following the shore of Lake Kopais from Orchomenos, if we assume that
Chaironeian territory did not extent to the Lake (Fossey 1988: 384) it was possible to reach
Lebadeia without crossing Chaironeian territory, which would explain why this city is not
mentioned in Plutarch’s account. Pausanias (10.35.1) calls this road lewf’roj; it is a
main artery connecting central Greece with the south (McInerney, 1999: 58-59) and starts
from Elateia, where Lysander mustered the armies of Phokis and the regions of central
Greece. 
King Pausanias, meanwhile, left with the Lakedaimonian army, met the Arcadians in
Tegea (Paus.3.5.4) and marched towards the Isthmus. He mobilised contingents from the
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Fig. 2. Possible Lysander´s Route (from Phokis to Lebadeia).
other allies along the way, except for the Korinthians, who refused to take part in the
expedition, although they allowed Pausanias to cross their territory. From the Isthmus, he
entered Megaris and set off for the Kithairon and Plataiai, and may have camped in Megara.38
In the north of Megarian territory, Pausanias must have taken the route to Plataiai (route
Hammond) 39 via the pass through Mt. Kithairon line of peaks. Just on the Boiotian frontier,
the route divides in two, the right-hand fork going to Hysiai and Thebes and the left down to
Plataiai. It is unlikely that Pausanias took the road from Pagas to Aigosthenai, which is very
arduous and tortuous. The Athenians, with much of their army in Thebes, would have found
it difficult to garrison Eleuteras and halt Pausanias’ advance. Moreover, since they had signed
an epimachia treaty they had no reason, in principle, to fear that Pausanias would attack
Attica.40 From Plataiai a road crossed the plain directly to Thespiai so there was no need to
go through Thebes. When Pausanias reached Plataiai, Lysander was already in Lebadeia and
they were both little more than twenty kilometres from Haliartos and, therefore,
approximately a day’s march away. 
According to Plutarch (Lys.28.2), from Lebadeia, Lysander sent a letter to Pausanias,
telling him to meet him in Haliartos. The letter was intercepted by some scouts and then
deciphered by the Thebans. The episode of the letter, not mentioned by Xenophon, who
was not acquainted with the Boiotian sources and whose informant was in Pausanias’ army,
is intrinsically probable. Given the difficulty of communication between Lysander and
Pausanias, the missive was probably necessary to confirm the exact date of the rendezvous.
Furthermore, Lysander’s messenger would have to have travelled from Lebadeia to
Plataiai without attracting the attention of the Boiotian army, which was stationed in
Thebes, but the Boiotians would have been patrolling all the routes to monitor the
movements of the enemy armies and could certainly have intercepted the letter.41 But,
more than anything else, the interception of the letter helps to explain the way subsequent
events unfolded: for example, the Thebans marching at night can be interpreted as a
response to an unexpected situation that their plans had not allowed for. After sending the
message, Lysander immediately set out for Haliartos, where he expected to arrive at dawn
on the following day. 
At the same time the Thebans, who now knew where the two armies were meeting and
that Pausanias would arrive late, marched out from their city. The route they took to cover the
twenty kilometres between Thebes and Haliartos can be reconstructed fairly easily. The great
road connecting central Greece and the Peloponnese with the north of Greece and which was
the main artery between the east and west of Boiotia, crossed the Teneric plain from Thebes
to the Steni Pass at the site of the sanctuary of Poseidon in Onchestos42, headquarters of a
Boiotian Amphiktiony. The sanctuary was situated in Kazarma Steni some four kilometres
38 In the early seventies, the Spartan expeditions against Thebes passed through Megaris. In 377, for
example, Agesilaos suffered thromboflebitis in Megara while retreating after his attack on Thebes (X.HG.5.4.58.)
39 X.HG.5.4.14; Hammond, 1954: 103-22. Buckler, 2003: 81 thinks Pausanias took the route from Pagas to
Agosthenai and from there to Plataiai; it would be a difficult route but one which, in his opinion, avoided the road
guarded by the Athenians in Eleuteras.
40 Cf. a similar situation in X.HG.5.4.33: although the Athenians had sent contingents to the aid of Thebes
against the Lakedaimonians in 378, Sphodrias, the Spartan harmost of Thespiai, subsequently invaded Attica while
Sparta and Athens were officially at peace (McDonald, 1972: 38-44.)
41 The account of the message has been rejected by Accame, 1951: 39, but without good reason (cf. Buck,
1994: 38, 140 n. 62; Buckler, 2003: 80.)
42 Him.Apolo.229-238; Pindar.Isth.1.32-3, 52-54, 4.19-23; Diod.17.10.4; Strabo.9.2.33;  Paus.9.26.5, 37.1;
Statius.Theb.7.271-272; Apollonios Rhodios.3.1240-1242; Nono.Dionisiaca.13.57-58; Steph.Byz.s.v.
Ogchst’j; Schachter Cult.II.207 and ff.;  M.H. McAllister Encyclopedia, 652; Buck 1979: 10; Wallace 1979:
135; Roesch 1982: 266-276 and Fossey 1988: 308-310.
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from Haliartos and had a settlement beside it.43 Onchestos may actually have been within
Haliartian territory. From Onchestos the road continued parallel to the shore of Lake Kopais,
following virtually the same route as that of the modern road. Approximately one kilometre
from Haliartos it crossed a river, today the Kephalari, probably the ancient Lophis, and
reached the city a little further on. The Thebans arrived first and sent part of their army into
Haliartos, while the larger contingent remained outside and were probably posted to the west,
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Fig. 3. The Thebans and King Pausanias.
43 Paus.9.26.5; Snodgrass, 1990: 136-7.
N
Contour intervals 200 m.
Scale: 1/200.000
around modern Mt. Likophios.
The route taken by Lysander and the positions of the two armies just before they engaged
are the three decisive elements for understanding the Battle of Haliartos, so they need to be
considered in detail. 
To reach Haliartos from Lebadeia and Koroneia, there were two possible routes. The
first follows the southern shore of Lake Kopais. Thus, from Lebadeia it first goes through
Koroneia, on the hill today known as Loutros (242 m), and from there continues to the
small town of Ayia Paraskevi (formerly Agoriani), to the south of which rises the rounded
hill of Dhekedhes. Although it is a mainly Mycenaean site, traces of the Late Geometric and
Classical Period have been found here.44 The road then went through Solinari some 2.5-3
kilometres northeast of Koroneia. There are two ancient sites in this village: a small peak
just at the foot of the hills to the south of Solinari in the chapel of Kostantinos and Eleni,
where Classical and Hellenistic pottery has been found, and, secondly, the church of Ayios
Yannis Theologos where Spyropoulos uncovered a sanctuary of Classical-Hellenistic date
just to the north of the church.45 The site to the south of Solinari (Kostantinos and Eleni)
and the temple to the north of the Ayios Yannis Theologos church have been identified
respectively as the ancient cwràov of Alalkomenai and the temple of Athena
Alalkomenia.46 From Alalkomenai/Solinari the route went through the narrow pass of
Vigla, a few metres wide, between the moutainside of Mt. Vigla or Petra (287 m) and the
southern shore of Lake Kopais. A tower guarded the Pass. Behind Vigla is Mt. Palaiothiva
or Paliophiva. The two peaks, Vigla and Palaiothiva, marked the border between the
territories of Koroneia and Haliartos and together most probably formed ancient
Tilphosaion47, where the Tilphousa spring rose beside the temple of Apollo Tilphosaion.
Somewhere in the vicinity there was also the sanctuary of the Praxidikai and, close to it,
the temple of Poseidon Hippios (Paus.9.33.1-3; Strabo.9.2.27). Once in Haliartian territory
the route goes through the modern town of Vrastamitas and comes to Haliartos some twelve
kilometres from Koroneia. The road then continued eastwards to Thebes, skirting the south
of the ancient city. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Leake (2.205) took this route
and reached Haliartos from Lebadeia in approximately six hours. 
Another route goes inland via Koutoumoulia, modern day Koronia. Thus from ancient
Koroneia, the path goes up the valley of the river Kephalovryso to Koutoumoulia; the route
then passes this settlement and skirts the southern side of Mt. Mitikas, although perhaps in
Antiquity the route went between Mitikas and Palaiothiva, which commands the Pass, and
comes out in the Zagara valley, which runs W-E and is flanked by the slopes of Mt. Helikon
(or Zagara, 1525 m) to the south, and Mts. Ayios Vassilios (962 m) and Kouphopithari (859
m)48 to the north. Close by the convent of Evangelistria, to the northeast of the modern
village of the same name and some five kilometres from Haliartos, there must have been a
small settlement, to judge by the tower and the few surviving buildings of polygonal rubble.49
The river Xirorrema or Zagara, perhaps the ancient Lamos (Aravantinos, 1996: 187), flows
44 Th. Spyropoulos (1973) AD. Khron, 272; Leake.2.135-6; Buck 1979: 7; Fossey, 1988: 335-336.
45 Th. Spyropoulos (1973),  AAA.6.381-5; (1973) Teiresias.3.1; (1973) AD. Khron.271.
46 Strabo.9.2.36; Paus.9.33.5; Plut.Mor.301 D; Pappakhatzis 5.200-2; Buck 1979: 6; Wallace 1979: 143;
Knauss, 1987: 4; Fossey 1988: 332-335.
47 Paus.9.33.1-3; Strabo.9.2.27,36; Fontenrose, 1969: 119-31; Fossey, 1972: 1-16.
48 Mt. Kouphopithari can be identified as the ancient Mt. Libetrion (Paus.9.34.4; Leake.2.205; Wallace,
1974: 21.)
49 Buck 1979: 9; Wallace 1979: 108; Roesch 1982: 256; Fossey 1988: 314-318, with an inscripion in honour
of Hadrianos (IG VII 2851) found here. An attempt has been made to indentify it with Okalea. Cf: Hym.Apolo.242;
Strabo.9.2.26; Steph.Byz.s.v. Okalûa; Dionysios Kalliphontos.96-101.
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through this valley, circling Mt. Goulas (665 m) to the south and flowing northwards through
an area called Paliomazi. It then joins the river Kephalari, which goes down the narrow valley
of the same name, passing the village of Mazi, until it flows into Lake Kopais. The ancient
road must have approximately followed the course of the Xirorrema/Zagara. 
We have various indications of the importance and use of this route. Firstly there is the
tower built on the Palaiothiva peak which kept watch over the route.50 On Apollo’s mythical
journey from Euboia to Delphi, after passing Onchestos, he went inland towards the
Telphousa spring, to the west of Haliartos, leaving the shore of Lake Kopais in this area.51 In
the campaign of 371, which ended in the Battle of Leuktra, the Spartan king Kleombrotos
reached Koroneia but, finding that the Boiotians held the gorges (Diod.15.53.1: t™j
par’douj), had to take another route along the southern coast.52 The use of the plural
probably means the Boiotians had occupied both Passes, Palaiothiva and Vigla. The
information on ancient Okalea, usually found in Evangelistria, could also point to the
existence of this route. According to Stephanos of Byzantion (s.v. Okalea) there was a route
from Thespiai to Okalea that did not go through Haliartos, and Dionysios Kalliphontos (96-
101) also appears to situate Okalea on a line between Orchomenos /Lebadeia and
Thespiai/Plataiai without mentioning Haliartos either.53 Moreover, the northern side of Mt.
Vigla must have been so close to the shore of Lake Kopais that it left little space for the road
to pass, and it must have been completely impassable during the winter when the level of the
Lake rose. Consequently, here, as in other parts of Boiotia, there were low, summer roads and
higher winter roads that avoided the higher level of the lake (Fontenrose, 1969: 120, 127).
The Koutoumoulia/Evangelistria path would have been one of these inland or winter routes. 
There are also indications that this route could have been used just the day before and
day after the battle. As we have said, the day before the battle Lysander sent a messenger with
a letter for Pausanias. This emissary, no doubt on horseback, since he had to cover the forty
kilometres from Lebadeia to Plataiai, could have taken the route through the Vigla Pass, along
the walls of Haliartos and turned inland along the Kephalari valley or through the Steni Pass
in Onchestos and then crossed Theban territory to Thespiai. Both alternatives would have
been very exposed for a message of such importance. It was much simpler and there was
greater chance of the message reaching its destination using the Koutoumoulia route. After
the battle, in the middle of the night, the Phokians and the rest of Lysander’s army withdrew
without the Thebans noticing until the following morning. The Thebans evidently camped on
the plain to the south of the city, so the Phokians could not have gone through them to reach
the Vigla Pass; in fact, the only way they could go back without being seen was by taking the
Koutoumoulia route, possibly the same way they had come. 
Gell (1827: 122) mentions this route at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It goes
to Lebadeia through the town of Zagora (Zagara), to Kutumula (Koutoumoulia) and from
there to Kalamachi, close to Lebadeia. Gell took two hours to go from Zagora to
Koutoumoulia and another two to get from there to Kalamachi. To this must be added the
distance between Kalamachi and Lebadeia and the six kilometres between Zagara and Mazi,
in the Kephalari valley, where Lysander may have camped, and taking into account that Gell
travelled on horseback at some six or seven kilometres an hour, the journey between Lebadeia
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50 Fossey (1972: 177) associates Phase II of the tower in rectangular ashlar with the fortification of the gorges
in 371; he also has a full bibliography. Buckler, 1981: 55 also mentions the narrow passes in Koroneia and
McKesson Camp II, 1991: 195.
51 Hym. Apolo.3.262-6; Fontenrose, 1969: 119, 123. 
52 X.HG.6.4.3; Paus.9.13.3; Diod.14.52.1-53-3; Fossey, 1972: 169-170. 
53 Fossey, 1988: 316-318. The information in Strabo that Okalea is on the shore of Lake Kopais, between
Haliartos and Alalkomenai, is probably an intrusive gloss in the manuscript (cf. Fossey LCM, 4.6, 1979, 113-6).
and Mazi could have been done in 395 in a single day in less than ten hours’ march. Frazer
(1905: 148, 150-151) also describes this road, which crosses a wooded valley where the
Zagara and Ayios Nikolaos monasteries are to be found. 
Plutarch (Lys.28.3) also says that the Thebans reached Haliartos before Lysander.
However, when Lysander sent the letter to Pausanias from Lebadeia, he was the same distance
from Haliartos, some twenty kilometres, as the Thebans. The Theban scouts first had to
intercept the letter and then go to Thebes, where the bulk of the army was massed, and only
then could the Thebans start off. Lysander probably sent the letter and started marching
towards Haliartos. It is difficult to claim that the Thebans were travelling faster while Lysander
was unaware that the letter had been intercepted, since Lysander had to arrive at the meeting
point at the time agreed and was also marching at night. If the Thebans left later and arrived
before him, Lysander’s delay would be easier to explain if he had taken the Koutoumoulia
road, which was some thirty-five kilometres from Haliartos and was steeper than the Vigla
route.  
Again, according to Plutarch (Lys.29.7), Lysander camped on a hill near Haliartos, called
Orchalides or Alopeke, which was part of Mt. Helikon, waiting for Pausanias to arrive the
same day. From his camp he marched on Haliartos, and as his army crossed the river Hoplites
it was attached from the rear by the Thebans who had remained outside the city and had its
walls on their left (Plut.Lys.28.3-5). The only way of interpreting Plutarch’s account is to
assume that Lysander’s position was on the final spurs of the Helikon overlooking Haliartos
from the south and southeast (Bommelaer, 1981: 194) and that, as he was advancing from the
southeast towards Haliartos, he was intercepted by the Thebans coming from the northwest.
That is, the two armies passed each other as they marched towards Haliartos. Thus the
Thebans, who had started in the east from Thebes, had reached the west of the city of Haliartos
and Lysander, who was coming from the west, from Koroneia, was to the southeast of the
Thebans and the city of Haliartos. Taking into account that the Thebans reached Haliartos
before Lysander, he had somehow managed to pass the Thebans’ position without coming up
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Fig. 4. Vigla and Evangelistria.
against them. If Lysander had come by the Vigla route, he would have gone right through the
Theban position without the Thebans attacking him even when he exposed his right flank to
them, which does not make sense. Once again, Lysander’s position to the southeast and the
Thebans to the northwest can be better understood if Lysander took the Koutoumoulia route. 
Finally, Lysander’s intention was primarily to rendezvous with Pausanias, who would be
coming to Haliartos from Thespiai, a road that joined the Koutoumoulia route, to the south of
Haliartos, on the outskirts of the modern village of Mazi. This is probably the other reason
why Lysander would have chosen the Koutoumoulia route, so that not only did he avoid
crossing the compromised Vigla Pass, but he could also keep watch on the route by which
Pausanias would be coming. 
In short, Lysander, coming from Lebadeia, passed Koroneia, advanced by the
Koutoumoulia route and, being unaware of the movements of the Theban army, was
overtaken by it. Lysander’s manoeuvre was designed to ensure the rendezvous of the two
armies and, had he known about the Thebans’ movements, he would have cut them off from
the Athenians and, after joining forces with Pausanias, crushed them.
Meanwhile, the morning after the battle Pausanias, who knew nothing about the
intercepted letter, took the route northwest from Plataiai to Thespiai. He must have crossed
the Asopos and Oeroe rivers and reached the site of ancient Eutresis54 on the Arkopodhi hill,
some nine kilometres from Plataiai. After that, 4.5 kilometres to the northwest, is Thespiai.55
From Thespiai, travelling northwest, a path turns into the valley of the river Kephalari and
comes out in Haliartos. This is the shortest route between Thespiai and Haliartos and today a
modern road (Thespies-Haliartos) follows approximately the same route as the ancient path
for some eleven kilometres. Pausanias (9.32.5) mentions this route, and so does Gell (1827:
121-123), who rode from Eremokastro (Thespiai) to Haliartos in just over three hours.
5. THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE POSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES.
Ancient Haliartos is situated on the hill now known as Kastri Maziou, to the west of the
modern village of Haliartos. In Antiquity it was right on the edge of Lake Kopais, so in winter
the north of the city was surrounded by the waters of the Lake. The steepest parts of the hill
are to the north and west. On the summit, to the northwest, was the  acropolis, with an area
of about 250 by 150 m., and the city below spread over the gentle slopes to the south and west
of the acropolis, between it and the modern road. The highest part of the acropolis reaches
164 metres and the city below is at a height of between 120 and 160 metres. In addition to
the wall encircling the acropolis, which preserves traces of polygonal, trapezoidal and
cyclopean walls, in 395 the city below was also surrounded by a wall, which had several
towers along it.56 The route from Thebes to Lebadeia passed beside the city’s southern wall;
the necropoleis were situated respectively to the east, southeast and west of the city and
flanked the route. Haliartos is the only certain point of the battle. The Haliartians massed
behind its walls, supported by a small Theban contingent that joined them in the city.
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54 Strabo.9.2.28; see H. Goldman (1931), Excavations at Eutresis in Boiotia. Cam. Mass.
55 Fossey, 1972: 170-171; 1988: 314-316; Bintliff, 1986: 1-3.
56 The sources are too numerous to summarise here, cf: IG.VII.2848-2857; Strabo.9.2.30; Paus.9.32.5;
Leake.2.206-8; Frazer.5.164-6; R.P. Austin (1925/26), “Excavations at Haliartos,” ABSA, 27, 81-91, (1926/27)
ABSA, 28,128-40; (1926) JHS, 234-5; (1931/32), ABSA, 180-212; (1931), JHS, 189-90; Pharaklas (1967), AE.
Parart. 20-8; Roesch Encyclopedia, 374-375; Buck 1979, 10; A.M. Snodgrass (1985), “The Cambridge/Bradford
Boiotian Expedition. Report on 1985 season,” Teiresias, 15, 2-4; Pappachatzis.5.195-200; Wallace 1979: 117-20;
Fossey 1988: 301-308; Scranton, 1941: 160, 170.
As we saw, Plutarch (Lys.28.3, 29.7) says that Lysander camped on a hill that was part
of Mt. Helikon, Orchalides or Alopeke, where he waited for Pausanias. He then advanced
along the path that led directly to Haliartos and was attacked after crossing the river Hoplites,
beside the Kissousa spring where marshy plants such as the Cretan storax grew
(Plut.Lys.28.3-4, 6, 29.4-5). The camp must have been near the gorge mentioned by
Xenophon or the rugged terrain Diodoros (14.81.2) talks about, where the Theban pursuit
ended some hours later, since Plutarch (Lys.28.6) says that Lysander’s troops fled towards the
hill, which we can interpret as being where they had their camp, and their pursuers were held
back by very rough terrain. Pausanias (9.33.4) also mentions a river, the Lophis, that flows
into the Lake near Haliartos and Strabo (9.3.3,5) says that Haliartos is close to a marsh that
produces flute reeds.57
To the south of Haliartos is the valley of the river Kephalari, which runs deep between
two spurs of Mt. Helikon cf. infra Fig. 7 Mt. Likophios rises to the west of the valley, with its
double peak, the southern one being the higher at 538 metres. Between Mt. Likophios’ two
peaks is a narrow gully known as the Mazi Gorge. The modern town of Mazi is in this part of
the valley, on the slope of a peaked hill (Leake.2.205). Mazi is where the routes from
Koutoumulia/Zagara and Erimokastro/Thespiai meet, and another goes on to Haliartos. In the
eastern part of the valley is Mt. Malaki, 294 metres high. Not only the summit of Mt. Malaki
but the whole of the area in general is much lower than Mt. Likophios.
The river Kephalari runs through the valley of the same name and, before it was drained
in the modern era, flowed into the Lake approximately a kilometre to the east of Haliartos. It
is possible that Pausanias gives the name of the more important river, so the Kephalari is
probably the ancient Lophis, but this does not mean it was the only river in the area or that
we should identify the Lophis mentioned by Pausanias with the Hoplites in Plutarch. In fact,
Leake (2.207) and Frazer (5.165) say that there were two rivers close to Haliartos, one of
57 On the reeds used to make flutes, see Pliny.NH.16. 66 and Theophrastos.4.11.8, 9.
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Fig. 5. Ancient Haliartos from West.
which flowed into the Lake to the west of Haliartos from the foot of the Mazi hill, while the
other, called the Kephalari, was to the east. A small stream flows from the Mazi Gorge, also
called Mazi, which splits in two as it leaves the Gorge: a torrent joins the river Kephalari just
to the north of Mazi and is shown on Frazer’s map (5.111), while the other flow to the western
part of Haliartos and Lake Kopais.   
Between the mouth of the Kephalari Valley and Haliartos there was a plain some five
hundred metres N-S and one thousand five hundred W-E, sufficient to accommodate the two
contending armies. According to Frazer (5.165), the northern side of the Haliartos hill is very
steep with the crypts of several tombs built into it, and a copious spring flowing into the
marshy area. To the west of the city was another necropolis containing a tumulus, where
several springs rise.58 It is possible then that the whole area to the north and west of the city
was marshy land in Antiquity. 
To sum up, the western part of the Kephalari valley and the space between this area and
the city of Haliartos match the description of the battlefield given in the sources. Lysander
could have camped in Mazi, where the Koutoumoulia and Thespiai routes converge. Modern
Kephalari must be the ancient Lophis and the Hoplites could be the Mazi torrent, which is a
tributary of the Kephalari. The road from Mazi to Haliartos would be the one referred to by
Plutarch (Lys.28.3) along which Lysander advanced. The battlefield would extend between
the left bank of the river Lophis/Kephalari, across the plain to the south of Haliartos, which
lies between the city itself and the Kephalari Valley, and extends to the marshy area to the
west where the Kissousa spring rises, site of the tombs of Rhadamanthos and Alea. The Mazi
Gorge could be the ravine where the Theban pursuit ended. 
In the case of the Thebans, Lysander appears to have been unaware of the Theban
presence. Xenophon (HG.3.5.18) mentions a small Theban contingent inside Haliartos, but
does not explain their presence, and says Lysander did not know they were there for he tried
to incite the Haliartians to defect from the Thebans. Pausanias (3.5.3) also says that they
entered the city unseen and Plutarch (Lys.28.3) informs us that they entered before Lysander
arrived and were in battle formation, together with the Haliartians, behind the wall,
(Plut.Lys.28.5: oá d° ùn t“ p’lei Qhba^ioi met™ t^wn `Aliartàwn suntetagmûnoi
tûwj), obviously not to defend the walls but preparing to come out and fight when the bulk
of the army joined battle. In fact, Plutarch says they did not move until that very instant. 
Xenophon (HG.3.5.18) tells us that a more numerous Theban corps, comprising
hoplites and horsemen, attacked swiftly outside Haliartos and, in his opinion, it was this
corps that decided the battle. He obviously misinterprets their presence because they could
not have been coming from Thebes because all the action took place on a single day and
in the same sequence (Cook, 1981: 285), so they must have been waiting nearby. Of the
two possible explanations he suggests for Lysander’s action (X.HG.3.5.19): that he did not
know they were nearby or that he thought he could defeat them, the first, that he was
caught unawares, is the most plausible. Otherwise it would seem that Lysander made a
tactical error in advancing to the wall, exposing the army’s left flank and rearguard to the
bulk of the Theban army. According to Plutarch (Plut.Lys.28.4-5, 29.3-4), the Thebans who
had remained outside the city attacked Lysander with the walls of Haliartos on their left,
that is, from the west, from behind and just as their enemies were crossing the river
Hoplites. Thus the Thebans must have been to the left of Lysander’s position where he
could not see them, somewhere on the mountainside between Mt. Likophios and the Vigla
Pass. 
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58 Frazer (5.165) identifies the stream on the hill with the Kissousa spring and the tumulus with the tomb of
Rhadamanthos or Alea.
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Fig. 6. The Battlefield from Ancient Haliartos.
6. CONCLUSIONS: RECONSTRUCTING THE BATTLE OF HALIARTOS
On the basis of all that has been said so far, we can now try to reconstruct the entire
battle. Lysander, with at least one Lakedaimonian mora and perhaps a small Peloponnese
levy, starting out from Sikyon rather than Korinth, disembarked in Phokis, possibly in the bay
of Antikyra. From Antikyra, he would have gone to Elateia, where he joined forces with the
Phokians and various allies from central Greece, including Herakleots, Ainians, Malians,
Oitaians and perhaps also the Dorians and Athamanians. Probably knowing that the
Orchomenians intended to defect, he took the most direct route to Orchomenos via Elateia,
Hympolis and Abai. When they saw him coming, the Orchomenians opened the gates, and
thus defected from the Boiotian Confederacy. Orchomenos accepted the Lakedaimonian
garrison, the pro-Spartan oligarchs were confirmed in power and the Orchomenians joined
Lysander’s army. With the Orchomenians, Lysander would have had some six thousand
soldiers, counting hoplites and horsemen, plus light infantry. From Orchomenos, following
the shore of Lake Kopais, Lysander crossed and plundered Lebadeian territory; consequently
the city remained on the side of the Confederacy. In Lebadeia, he sent a letter to Pausanias
who, if he had followed the Spartan plans, should already have been in Plataiai, with
instructions to meet him the following day in Haliartos. In order to reach Haliartian territory,
Lysander crossed Koroneia, which did not desert the Confederacy either, and, taking the
Koutoumoulia route inland, at dawn encamped on the spurs at the end of the Kephalari valley,
to the south of Haliartos, probably in Mazi. The hill was well protected by the rivers
Hoplites/Mazi to the north and Lophis/Kephalari to the east and overlooked the route from
Thespiai and the plain that lay between the river Hoplites and the city of Haliartos. He set
camp there and waited for Pausanias who, coming from Thespiai, should have appeared a few
hours later.
However, the Thebans intercepted and deciphered the Lysander’s message and decided
to engage Lysander’s army before he could join forces with Pausanias. So they left the
Athenians protecting Thebes, either within the city itself or stationed to the south of it to
prevent Pausanias attacking and, marching by night, covered the twenty kilometres between
Thebes and Haliartos by the Steni Pass and the shore of Lake Kopais. They arrived before
dawn and before Lysander, stationed part of the army in the city but the larger contingent
outside it, lying in wait, probably around Mt. Likophios, out of sight from the south and
southeast. 
Lysander, unaware that his message had been intercepted and that the Theban army was
close by, planned to incite Haliartos to defect from the Confederacy. The sources say he was
impatient, but this is probably a misinterpretation: Lysander must have thought that his forces
were vastly superior to those of the Haliartians and that the defection of Haliartos would be
a severe blow to Thebes. The city would lose control of western Boiotia, and he could chalk
up another victory before the arrival of Pausanias, who outranked him, making the conquest
his alone. So he advanced by the route from Thespiai to Haliartos and, crossing the river
Hoplites, perhaps the torrent that comes down from Mt. Likophios, approached the city walls. 
From then on the confrontation could be called an ambush, and seems to follow a
premeditated plan by the Thebans. The major part of the army, with the walls of Haliartos to
its left, attacked Lysander’s rearguard and left flank from the west and immediately
afterwards, the Haliartians and Thebans waiting inside the city attacked from the front once
Lysander’s battle formation had been weakened. Lysander and some others died in this
coordinated attack and the army broke ranks and fled. Thebans and Haliartians then pursued
Lysander’s troops up the hill where they had encamped and the slopes of Mt. Likophios, from
whose heights Lysander’s soldiers fought off their pursuers. A thousand of Lysander’s troops
were lost and between two and three hundred of their enemies died, most of them Thebans. 
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The news of Lysander’s defeat took Pausanias by surprise when he was still between
Plataiai and Thespiai and, it would seem, far from making haste, he arrived at Haliartos the
day after the battle. Once in Haliartos, Pausanias possibly camped in the same place as
Lysander had done the previous day and initially intended to join battle with the Thebans and
Haliartians but he immediately recognised that he faced a difficult situation. On one hand, the
bodies were close to the city walls, and if he tried to recover them by force, the other side
would harry them from the walls and they would suffer serious casualties. Pausanias’ six
thousand men must have represented a contingent approximately equal to the Thebans but he
had fewer horsemen. In addition the allies had little enthusiasm for battle (X.HG.3.5.23); it
was ebbing away as they saw the conditions in which the fighting would take place. Pausanias
remained indecisive all that day, thus losing precious time if his troops were to engage the
enemy. The next day, the second after the battle, when the Athenians arrived under the
command of Thrasyboulos59, who must have come by the same route as the Thebans and
joined forces with them, Pausanias no longer had any choice. So, despite the opposition of his
Spartan advisers, and no doubt against the advice of the polemarchs and penteconters,
Pausanias decided not to fight and asked the Thebans for a truce to take up the dead, which
meant explicitly acknowledging defeat. In exchange for allowing them to take their dead, the
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59 X.HG.3.5.22 and ff, Lys.14.5, 14; 16.13-14; Plut.Lys.29.1; Paus.3.5.4.
Fig. 7. The Battle of Haliartos.
Scale: 1/50.000
Contour Intervals 20 m
Thebans demanded the withdrawal of Pausanias’ army. Once they had collected the bodies,
the Lakedaimonians withdrew by a pre-determined route and were not permitted to set foot
on Boiotian land.60 According to Plutarch, Lysander’s body was buried in Panopeian territory,
on the Sacred Way from Chaironeia to Delphi. This means that the Thebans did not allow
Pausanias to return to the Peloponnese via Mt. Kithairon, but made him go back across Phokis
and cross by sea, thus making his retreat even more ignominious. 
The battle of Haliartos, the defeat and the humiliating withdrawal of the Lakedaimonians
had two immediate consequences, both in internal Lakedaimonian politics and in the general
course of the war. In Sparta it led to a regrouping of political factions with the disappearance
of the old leaders that had dominated Spartan politics since the end of the Peloponnesian War.
King Agis had died in 400, Lysander perished at Haliartos and King Pausanias was brought
to trial for his conduct at Haliartos, condemned to death in his absence and lived out the rest
of his life in exile in Tegea.61 Their demise explains a key feature of Sparta’s evolution until
the middle of the fourth century: the predominance of Agesilaos, who became the central
figure in Spartan politics until his death in 359 and, of all the Spartan kings, perhaps the most
powerful. 
For the other side, the victory at Haliartos led to the Korinthians and Argives joining the
coalition and the allies momentarily recovering the initiative in the war, which they exploited
to wage a campaign in central Greece and Thessaly in 394. It is true that Sparta regained the
initiative later the same year, but the alliance with Korinth and Argos meant that the centre of
conflict moved to Korinth and, as a result, both Boiotia and Attica escaped Spartan incursions
for the rest of the war. But perhaps the most important consequence of the battle was that the
Spartans were obliged to recall Agesilaos, thus abandoning their empire in Asia, which would
be lost after the naval battle of Knidos in 394. Despite Agesilaos’ promise that he would
return, like a McArthur of the Ancient World, he never again set foot on Asian soil.
REFERENCES
ACCAME, S. (1951): Ricerche intorno a la Guerra corinzia, Naples.
ALONSO TRONCOSO, V. (1997): “Tratados y relaciones de alianza en la Guerra de Corinto
[395-386 A.C.]” RSA, 27, 30-35.
AMIT, M. (1962): “The Sailors of the Athenian Fleet,” Athenaeum.60.157-78.
AMIT, M. (1965): Athens and the Sea. A Study in Athenian Sea-power. Bruxelles.
ANDERSON, J. K.  (1975): “The Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C,” CSCA, 7, 27-53.
ARAVANTINOS, V. L. (1996): “Topographical and Archaeological Investigations on the Summit
of Helicon” in A. Hurst, A. Schachter (eds), La montagne des Muses, Geneve, 185-192.
BELOCH, K. J. (1912-27): Griechische Geschichte2. 3.1. Strasburg, Berlin.
BEQUIGNON, Y. (1937): La vallée du Spercheios des origines au IVe siècle, Paris.
BINTLIFF, J. L. (1986): “Cambridge/Bradford Boeotian Expedition 1985/86. The Thespiae
City Survey,” Teiresias.16.1-3.
BOMMELAER, J. F. (1981): Lysandre de Sparte. Histoire et traditions. Paris.
BRUCE, I.A.F. (1967): An Historical Commentary on the Hellenicha Oxyrhynchia. Cambridge.
BRUCE, I.A.F. (1961): “The democratic revolution at Rhodes,” CQ, 11, 166 y ss.
BUCK, R. J. (1979): A History of Boiotia, Edmonton.
JOSÉ PASCUAL64
Gladius, XXVII (2007), pp. 39-66. ISSN: 0435-029X
60 X.HG.3.5.24; Fernández Nieto.I.109-110, 231-233. Cf. the same terms in Delion: Th.4.98.7-8; Munn,
1997: 71.
61 X.HG.3.5.21-25; Plut.Lys.29.1-3, 30.1; Paus.3.5.4-6; Parke, 1945: 109.
BUCK, R. J. (1993): “The Outbreak of the Boiotian War” in J. M. Fossey (ed.) Boeotia
Antiqua, III. Papers in Boiotian History, Institutions and Epigraphy in Memory of Paul
Roesch, Amsterdam, 91-99.
BUCK, R. J. (1994): Boiotia and the Boiotian League, 423-371 B.C., Edmonton.
BUCKLER, J. (1980): The Theban Hegemony (371-362 B.C). Cambridge, Massachusetts and
Boston.
BUCKLER, J. (1996): “Helikon and Klio”, in A. Hurst, A. Schachter (eds), La montagne des
Muses, Geneve, 127-139.
BUCKLER, J. (2003): Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC, Leiden, Boston.
CARTLEDGE, P. (1987): Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta. Baltimore.
COOK, M. L. (1981): “Boeotia in the Corinthian War: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics,”
Dis. Univ. of  Washington.
CORNELIUS, F. (1932): “Die Schlacht bei Sardes,” Klio, 26, 29-31. 
DE VOTO, J. G. (1988): “Agesilaos and Tissaphernes near Sardis in 395 B.C.,” Hermes, 116,
41-53.
DELEBECQUE, E. (1957) : Essai sur la vie de Xénophon, Paris.
DUGAS, C. (1910) : “La campagne d’Agésilas en Asie Mineure (395). Xénophon et
l’Anonyme d’Oxyrhynchos,” BCH, 34, 58-95.
EDDY, S. K. (1964): “Athens’ Peacetime Navy in the Age of  Pericles,” GRBS, 9, 141-56.
FERNANDEZ NIETO, F. J. (1975): Los acuerdos bélicos en la Antigua Grecia. 2 vols. Santiago
de Compostela.
FONTENROSE, J. E. (1969): “The Spring Telphusa,” TAPhA.100.119-31. 
FORNIS, C. (2003): “MAXH KPATEIN en la Guerra de Corinto: Las batallas hoplíticas de
Nemea y Coronea (394 A.C.)”, Gladius, 23, 141-160.
FOSSEY, J. M. (1972): “Tilphosaion,” en J.M. Fossey (ed.), Proccedings of the first
International Conference on Boiotian Antiquities. Teiresias, supl.I. Montreal, 1-16 (repr.
in Fossey, J. M. (1990), Papers in Boiotian Topography and History, Amsterdam, 169-
184.)
FOSSEY, J. M. (1986): The Ancient Topography of Eastern Phokis. Amsterdam. 
FOSSEY, J. M. (1988): Topography and Population of Ancient Boiotia. Chicago.
FRAZER, J. G. (1913): Pausanias’ Description of Greece. Vol.5. London. 
FUNKE, P. (1990): Homónoia und Arche. Athen und die griechische Staatenwelt vom des
peloponnesischen Krieges bis zum Königsfrieden (440/3-387/6 v. Chr.), Wiesbaden.
GELL, W. (1827): Itinerary of Greece, London.
GRAY, V. J. (1979): “Two Different Approaches to the battle of Sardis in 395 B.C.: Xenophon
Hellenica. 3.4.20-24 and Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, 11. (6).4-6,” CSCA, 12, 183-200.
HAMILTON, C. D. (1970): “Spartan Politics and Policy, 405-401 B.C.,” AJPh.91.294-314.
HAMILTON, C. D. (1979): Sparta’s Bitter Victories. Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian
War. Ithaca and London.
HAMILTON, C. D. (1991): Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony. Ithaca and
London.
HAMMOND, N. G. L. (1954): “The Main Road from Boeotia to the Peloponnese through
Northern Megarid,” ABSA, 49, 103-22.
Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (1993): edidit M. Chambers, Leipzig, 1993, Teubner.
HORNBLOWER, S. (1992): “Sicily and the Origins of the Corinthian War,” Historia, 41, 121-123.
KASE, E. W, Szmeler, G.J. (1982): “Xerxes’ March through Phokis (Her.8,31-35)” Klio.64,
353-66
KNAUSS, J. (1987): “Munich Kopais Expedition Topographical Surveys of October 1986 and
May 1987,” Teiresias, 17, 4.
KROMAYER, J., Veith, G., Kaupert, W. (1931): Antike Schlachtfelder. IV, Berlin. 
THEBAN VICTORY AT HALIARTOS (395 B.C.) 65
Gladius, XXVII (2007), pp. 39-66. ISSN: 0435-029X
LARSEN, J. A. O. (1968): Greek Federal States. Their Institutions and History. Oxford.
LEAKE, W. M. (1835): Travels in Northern Greece. Vol.2 (Attica, Boeotia, Locris and
Euboea). London. 
MCDONALD, A. (1972): “A Note on the Raid of Sphodrias”, Historia, 21, 38-44.
MCINERNEY, J. (1999): The Folds of Parnassos. Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis, Texas,
Austin.
MCKESSON CAMP II, J. (1991): “Notes on the Towers and Borders of Classical Boiotia” AJA,
91, 193-202
MUNN, M. H. (1997): “Thebes and Central Greece” in L.A. Tritle, The Greek World in the
Fourth Century, London and New York
MUNN, M. H. (1987): “Agesilaos´ Boiotian Campaigns and the Theban Stockade of 378-377
B.,C.”, Classical Antiquity, 6, 106-138.
MUNN, M. H. (1993): The Defense of Attica. The Dema Wall and the Boiotian War of 378-375
B.C., Berkeley, Los Angeles
PAPPACHATZIS, N. Dh. (1969): Παυσανι´ο Ελλαδος Περιη´γησις. V. Βοιωτικα´ και´
Φωκικα´. Athens. 
PARKE, H.W. (1945): “The Deposing of Spartan Kings,” CQ.39.108-12. Phoenix. 39.119-33.
PASCUAL, J. (1995): “Tebas y la Confederación beocia en el período de la Guerra de Corinto
(395-386 a.C.)” Diss. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.
PASCUAL, J. (1996): “La Confederación beocia a principios del siglo IV a.C.: I. La
distribución territorial de las póleis”, Gerión, 14, 109-142.
PRITCHETT W.K. (1969): Studies in Ancient Greek Topography. II. Berkeley, Los Angeles.
ROESCH, P. (1982): Etudes béotiennes. Paris.
SCHACHTER, A. (1976): “Homeric Hymn to Apollo lines 231-238. (The Onquestos Episode):
Another Interpretation,” BICS.23, 102-13.
SCHACHTER, A. (1986): Cults of Boiotia, vol. II. BICS, Suppl.38.2. London.
SCRANTON, R. L. (1941): Greek Walls, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
SEAGER, R. (1967): “Thrasybulus, Conon and the Athenian Imperialism 396-386 B.C.,” JHS,
87, 95-115.
SEAGER, R. (1994): “The Corinthian War” CAH. The Fourth Century, vol. VI. Cambridge.
Second edition.
SEKUNDA, N. (1998): The Spartan Army, Oxford.
SEKUNDA, N. (2002):  Ancient Greeks, Oxford.
SNODGRASS, A.M. (1990): Arqueología de Grecia. Barcelona.
STILWELL, R. (ed.) (1976): The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites. Princeton
University Press, New Jersey.
STRAUSS, B.S. (1984): “Thrasybulus and Conon: A Rivaltry in Athens in the 390s B.C.,”
AJPh, 105, 37-48.
TOD, M.N. (1946-48): A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. 2 vols. Oxford. 
WALLACE, P.W. (1974): “Hesiod and the Valley of the Muses,” GRBS. 15,5-24.
WALLACE, P.W. (1979): Strabo’s Description on Boiotia. A Commentary. Heidelberg.
WESTLAKE, H.D. (1985): “The Sources for the Spartan Debacle at Haliartus,” Phoenix,
39, 119-133.




Gladius, XXVII (2007), pp. 39-66. ISSN: 0435-029X
